





Chicago Nuclear Attack

Prepare, Respond, and Recover: Engineers' Involvement with Local Disasters *October 19, 2006*

Introduction

- Highlight issues, not specific actions to initiate
- Describe consequence of a detonation
- Use scenario to present material
- Use a mapping program for illustration
- Consider first responder issues, structural vulnerabilities and decontamination





Nuclear Detonation

- Planning Scenarios developed by the HSC in partnership with DHS
- Scenario 1 of 15 is a 10-kT nuclear device

Version 2

PLANNING SCENARIOS Executive Summaries

Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities

The Homeland Security Council

David Howe, Senior Director for Response and Planning

July 2004

Nuclear Detonation

- Rucksack Bombs: Smaller. ½ Kiloton, 70 lbs carrying weight
- Suitcase bomb: Small Atomic Demolition Munitions (SADM)
 - Explosive yield: 1 kT; Size, 24x16x8 inches
 - Detonation Process: 1 person, 20-30 minutes
 - Accountability questions in former Soviet states



Nuclear Detonation Scenario

- Terrorist members assemble a gun-type nuclear device using highly enriched uranium (HEU) stolen from a nuclear facility located in the former Soviet Union
- Components are smuggled into the USA and assembled in Chicago suburb
- Using a delivery van, terrorists transport and detonate the device downtown





Nuclear Detonation Scenario

- Most buildings within 1,000 meters are severely damaged
- Injuries from flying debris may occur out to 6 kilometers
- Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) damages
 electronic devices within about 5 kilometers
- A mushroom cloud rises above the city and begins to drift with prevailing winds

Likely Results

- Blast
- Heat numerous fires located throughout the immediate blast zone
- Fallout









Likely Results

Blast








Scenario


- GIS Demonstration of area
 - Highlight area effected immediately
 - Highlight spread of contamination



250 km - Moderate to Low Acute Radiation Exposure Injuries




8000 sq. km Potential Decontamination Area






20km Moderate to Low Acute Radiation Exposure Injuries






5km EMP Damage 6km Missile Debris Injuries & Damage






1KM Direct Infrastructure Severe Damage





1KM Direct Infrastructure Severe Damage





First Response

- Establishing the nature of the event
 - High explosive?
 - Chemical attack?
 - Nuclear detonation?
- Defining the Contamination Zone—the Hot Zone
 - Will it migrate?



First Response

- Police: Establish perimeter, protect crime scene
- Fire, Hazmat, Emergency Services: Rescue survivors
- Are contemporary response protocols adequate?



Gaining access to survivors

- Can first responders enter the zone?
 - Contamination
 - Structural damage and instability
 - Engineering expertise required to assess damage



Protecting Hot Zone

- Keeping people out and keeping people in
- Use of Force Protocols
- Use of Rapidly Deployed Fence
- Vehicle Decontamination to Allow Exit



Nuclear Detonation

- Decontamination
 - Environment so survivors may be accessed
 - People so survivors do not introduce contamination to treatment areas
 - Debris so discarded materials may be removed safely
 - Protecting the Crime Scene



New Response Protocols

- Determining nature of the event
- Monitoring movement of hot zone
- Establishing a perimeter to keep people from entering the hot zone
- Collaboration with technical community
 - Radiation exposure
 - Structural and infrastructure damage
 - Decontamination
 - Search, Rescue



Civil Engineer Role

- Structural Analysis
- Decontamination
- Debris Removal



Nuclear Detonation

Concluding Remarks

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